AIA GN monitoring: The сhange in Iranian rhetorics towards Azerbaijan
Published: 2025-05-14 13:42
Over the past three weeks, there has been a distinct and observable shift in the rhetoric of Iranian media toward Azerbaijan. Whereas earlier coverage was characterized by a tone that was both condescending and confrontational —primarily in reaction to Azerbaijan’s increasingly close ties with Israel and frequently accompanied by overt threats directed at Baku and the country’s leadership—the prevailing narrative in recent weeks has taken a markedly different turn. The dominant message now underscores the perceived need to "win over" Azerbaijan and to "disconnect" it from its growing relationship with Israel.
An analysis of recent media publications indicates that this rhetorical pivot is likely motivated by Azerbaijan’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords — a development that appears to have triggered a recalibration in Tehran’s media strategy. In this context, Iranian outlets have begun to temper their messaging, seemingly in an effort to reduce tensions in the lead-up to the anticipated visit of Masoud Pezeshkian to Baku 28.04.2025.
Below are selected examples illustrating this shift in coverage:
1. 28.04.2025, website of Iran’s English-language television channel Press TV: “The purchase (importing up to 110,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Azerbaijan to Iran) could help Iran replace the Israeli regime as the main buyer of Azerbaijani oil.”
2. 28.04.2025, Iranian reformist newspaper Sharg: “Pezeshkian’s visit to Baku may signal an effort by Iran to reassess its role in the South Caucasus and to curb the influence of foreign actors—particularly Israel, which has strengthened its position in Baku by purchasing 90,000 barrels of oil per day”.
3. 28.04.2025, Asia expert Mehdi Khorsand, writing in the Iranian state-affiliated conservative daily Hamshahri: “The presence of the world’s largest Shiite population after Iran in Azerbaijan could pave the way for broader cooperation… By expanding economic collaboration across various sectors, it is possible to minimize shared concerns and prevent the destabilizing interference of external actors <…> However, we have not been able to take proper advantage of these opportunities.”
4. 29.04.2025, state-affiliated newspaper Farhikhtegan: “Active diplomacy in the Caucasus region—given the significance of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s trip to Baku—could play a substantial role in curbing the growing influence of Israel.”
5. 29.04.2025, Iranian media outlet Nournews, affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council of Iran: “Pezeshkian’s visit to Baku should be seen as a strategic opportunity to overcome past misunderstandings, develop a new roadmap for bilateral relations, and strengthen Iran’s position as a reliable partner in the Caucasus. With political will and public support on both sides, Tehran and Baku now have the chance to chart a brighter, more stable, and cooperative future for the entire region.”
6. 29.04.2025, state-affiliated newspaper Farhikhtegan, owned by the Islamic Azad University and associated with the Paydari party, published an article titled “Israel’s Presence in Trade Between Tehran and Baku Is Diminishing”: “The growth and expansion of Azerbaijan’s trade relations with Iran in the early years of independence reflected shared consumer interests and preferences, as well as a number of unifying factors—cultural, linguistic, and geographic similarities; extensive customs exemptions; a common land and sea border; and the relative ease of trading with Iran.”
7. 29.04.2025, Iranian analyst Ehsan Movahedian, writing for the Iranian news agency YJC, affiliated with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the country's state broadcaster, commented on the outcome of President Pezeshkian’s visit to Azerbaijan:
“If the border that Azerbaijan closed five years ago due to the coronavirus is reopened, interaction between our countries will increase, and the schemes of the Zionists and other states seeking to undermine our relations will fail.”
He called for the development of a policy of good neighborliness and for closer cooperation with Azerbaijan in order to prevent Israel from "causing harm." According to him, such collaboration would create greater economic opportunities and, in turn, strengthen Iran’s position in negotiations with the United States.
8. 30.04.2025, Iranian news and analysis website Rahborde Moaser: “Although the military and intelligence alliance between Azerbaijan and the Zionist regime poses a threat to Iran’s national interests, it appears that both sides are engaging in discussions with Washington over the Iranian nuclear issue more seriously than ever before. On the other hand, it seems that the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the President of Iran share a consensus on the need to resolve this matter as swiftly as possible in order to neutralize any internal or external conspiracies.”
9. 30.04.2025: Kayhan, one of Iran’s most influential and hardline newspapers and a mouthpiece for Supreme Leader Khamenei: “The Prime Minister of the Zionist regime, Netanyahu, is expected to arrive in Baku next week to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the country’s Jewish community—possibly in an attempt to offset the positive impact of our President’s recent visit to Azerbaijan.”
10. 01.05.2025, reformist newspaper Etemaad: “Pezeshkian’s visit could represent an effective step toward restoring good-neighborly relations that would benefit both Iran and Azerbaijan.”
11. 01.05.2025, Abolfazl Najarzadeh, CEO of Bank Melli Iran, announced on X (formerly Twitter) the resumption of the bank’s operations in Baku: “This decision reflects the determination of both countries to expand their trade relations and represents an excellent opportunity for economic stakeholders.”
12. 01.05.2025, Sadeif Badri, head of the Iran-Azerbaijan Parliamentary Friendship Group, told the official state news agency IRNA: “During the visit, the Iranian side made several requests, including the facilitation of land border crossings for Iranian students studying in Azerbaijan, as well as the reopening of the border for passenger travel. The Azerbaijani side agreed to carefully consider the matter of reopening the border.”
13. 02.05.2025, Iranian conservative news outlet Khabar Online: “There is a proven model from the early 1990s, and if we draw lessons from that historical experience, it is entirely possible to see a revival of the Hashemi Rafsanjani–Heydar Aliyev relationship in the form of a Pezeshkian–Ilham Aliyev partnership.”
14. 02.05.2025, one of the Iran's most influential and conservative newspaper Kayhan: “The visit of Mr. Pezeshkian, the President of our country, to Baku—following a period of tension between the two nations—is viewed as an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and advance Iran’s strategic interests. Deepening diplomatic ties between Iran and Azerbaijan requires long-term planning, the cultivation of trust, and constructive engagement. If differences are managed wisely and existing opportunities are effectively utilized, relations between the two countries could reach a strategic level and serve as a model for regional cooperation”.
15. 03.05.2025, Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): “Azerbaijani media consistently emphasized areas of agreement and shared interests—such as the economy, transportation, the Karabakh statement, regionalism, and cultural ties—while points of tension, including Israel, the specifics of the Zangezur Corridor, past incidents like the embassy attack or alleged plots, and differences in the interpretation of history or poetry, were downplayed or omitted. This selective focus reinforces a narrative of successful normalization. The dominant narrative promoted by Azerbaijani media—particularly those outlets under state control or aligned with the government—portrayed President Pezeshkian’s visit as a major diplomatic success, marking a ‘new chapter’ in bilateral relations, characterized by renewed trust, fraternal ties, and an emphasis on mutually beneficial cooperation, especially in the fields of economy and transportation.”
16. 03.05.2025, the above-mentioned article from Tasnim was reprinted in the Iranian state-affiliated conservative daily Hamshahri.
17. 03.05.2025, official state news agency IRNA: “During the recent visit of the President to the Republic of Azerbaijan—accompanied by the governor and representatives of the Ardabil Chamber of Commerce—an agreement was reached to establish a railway terminal in Parsabad. It is expected that the development of relations with the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan will create a favorable environment and open new opportunities for unlocking the potential of Ardabil Province”.
18. 04.05.2025, a video report by Mehr News Agency, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader Khamenei, covered Pezeshkian’s visit to Baku under the headline: “A Meeting with Relatives; From Tehran to Baku.”
19. 04.05.2025, Mehr News Agency, affiliated with Supreme Leader Khamenei: Headline: “Baku’s View of Tehran with an Eye Toward Reducing Dependence on Ankara and Tel Aviv”. The ruling authorities’ efforts to maintain the Aliyev family's grip on power and suppress opposition at all levels and in all spheres cannot be ignored. This is a regime that has governed the country for more than 35 years. Yet it should also be noted that following the end of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijani strategists have sought to enhance their influence and power—both regionally and among neighboring states—through shifts in foreign policy. One such approach involves attempting to engage both the West and the East simultaneously, with the aim of maximizing benefits and ensuring the stability necessary to preserve the Aliyev family’s continued rule. In this context, we observe a recalibration in Baku’s regional policy, including outreach and meetings with Iranian officials, alongside a subtle weakening of ties with Tel Aviv and Ankara—all of which can be interpreted as part of this broader strategic adjustment. Recognizing the significant potential of the Islamic Republic of Iran—both in confronting its adversaries and in supporting its allies—Baku appears to have concluded that cooperation with a leading regional power may yield greater benefits. Conversely, Baku seems to have taken a sober view of the unstable state of the occupying regime and understands that betting on a losing side is a strategic miscalculation. It cannot rely on a regime that is mired in pervasive crisis.
20. 14.05.2025, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bakaei for Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): “Given the ongoing normalization of relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan, the necessary steps have been taken, and the process of selecting an ambassador is now in its final stage.”
By Azerbaijani-Israeli Alliance Global News